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P S Y C H O L O G I C A L  S C I E N C E
Lenience breeds strictness: The generosity-erosion 
effect in hiring decisions
Marc-Lluís Vives1*, Tania Fernandez-Navia2, Jordi J. Teixidó2, Miquel Serra-Burriel3
In recruitment processes, candidates are often judged one after another. This sequential procedure affects the 
outcome of the process. Here, we introduce the generosity-erosion effect, which states that evaluators might be 
harsher in their assessment of candidates after grading previous candidates generously. Generosity is defined as 
giving a candidate the lowest possible grade required to progress in the hiring process. Analyzing a high-stake 
hiring process, we find that for each candidate graded generously, the probability for subsequent candidates to 
pass decreased by 7.7% (experiment 1; N = 11,281). Testing the boundary conditions of the generosity-effect, we 
explore a hiring process that, in contrast to the previous process, was very selective, because candidates were 
more likely to fail than to pass. In this scenario, no evidence is found for the generosity-erosion effect (experiment 2; 
N = 3171). Practical implications and mechanisms underlying the generosity-erosion effect are further discussed.
INTRODUCTION
Many judgments and decisions should be made independently. 
These decisions, however, are rarely faced in isolation; they often 
come sequentially (1). One after the other, teachers grade their stu-
dents or judges evaluate whether to give prisoners parole. In princi-
ple, each candidate, be they a student or a prisoner, should be 
evaluated solely based on their merits—or demerits—regardless of 
their position in the sequence. This is often not the case: People’s 
judgments and decisions suffer from sequential effects, which sub-
stantially, and unfairly, affect ones’ chances of receiving a positive 
or negative evaluation (2, 3). Sequence effects can thus jeopardize 
the fairness and efficiency of relevant deliberation processes.
Although sequential effects are a well-established phenomenon 
found in a plethora of contexts (4–6), doubts can be cast on whether 
their consequences are so critical and extended. So far, most re-
search has examined sequential effects in individual judgments and 
decisions [few exceptions: (2, 3)]. However, in today’s world, crucial 
decisions are often the result of a collective effort made by a group 
of experts. Collective decision making promotes normative and 
more accurate behavior [wisdom of the crowds (7–10)]. Here, we 
explore sequential effects in two hiring processes relying on the col-
lective judgment of a committee of evaluators. In the first process, 
we investigate the existence of arbitrary biases in more than 10,000 
assessments by 165 committees composed of five experts who eval-
uated candidates for a permanent public teaching position in Catalonia, 
Spain. In the second process, we repeat the same analysis for the 
evaluation of more than 3000 candidates for the position of judge in 
Spain, also collectively evaluated by a committee of nine experts. 
Establishing the existence, as well as the mechanism of sequential 
effects in collective judgments, is crucial to understanding the ex-
tent to which sequential effects can affect everyday life decisions.
Sequential effects have mainly been explained as the by-product 
of cognitive biases such as contrast effects or narrow bracketing. 
Simply put, the fifth candidate of the day may be less likely to obtain 
a positive evaluation than the first candidate either because (i) it is 
possible to compare the fifth candidate with a previous very good 
candidate (contrast effect) (11, 12) or (ii) evaluators might, implic-
itly or explicitly, keep mental score of their evaluation during the 
day and try to avoid huge deviations from what they expect to be the 
mean evaluation of the population (narrow bracketing) (13). One 
crucial factor neglected in the literature is that the type of decision 
most commonly studied has largely been social decisions, that is, 
deciding about the future of other people—e.g., grading Master of 
Business Administration (MBA) applicants (13) or giving prisoners 
parole (14). This social element might also factor into the decision 
process. We make use of relevant research from the social decision- 
making literature to describe a previously unidentified mechanism 
in which sequence effects can affect high-stake evaluations.
If examined closely, a group of evaluators grading candidates 
can be understood as an interaction between two parties in which 
one holds all the power to decide the outcome and the other does 
not. This structure parallels a dictator game in which one party is 
given an endowment of money and can decide how much money to 
share with another party if any (15). In the dictator game, people are 
relatively generous in the first iterations of the game but become 
less generous as more rounds unfold (16). Repetition thus seems to 
erode generosity. In an evaluation setting, giving a weak candidate 
a pass (“sparing” them) when it is unclear whether they deserved it 
can be understood as an act of generosity. According to the social 
decision-making literature then, as the sequence unfolds, candidates 
will become more likely to fail if evaluators have previously acted 
generously. We call this the generosity-erosion effect. Here, we test 
this effect and compare it with the contrast and narrow-bracketing 
effects. Relying on data from a high-stake hiring process, we analyzed 
the grades of 11,281 candidates in an oral exam conducted to select 
public teachers in Catalonia, Spain. We show that the generosity- 
erosion effect has the strongest and most persuasive impact on juries’ 
evaluations in comparison with previous effects described in the 
literature. Specifically, our results show that the likelihood of suc-
cess decreases by 7.7% for each previous candidate that received the 
lowest assessment possible to continue with the hiring process. Af-
ter finding prevailing evidence for the existence of the generosity- 
erosion effect, we test the pervasiveness of the effect by investigating 
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its boundary conditions, which can shed light on the mechanisms 
behind it.
RESULTS
The generosity-erosion effect when hiring public teachers
We define as an act of generosity the evaluation of a candidate with 
the minimum grade possible to continue in the hiring process (5.00 
of 10). Assuming that it is impossible to assess the merit of a candi-
date at a decimal level, which in the case of a 5.00 makes the differ-
ence between a candidate failing and passing, a final grade of 5.00 is 
partially a sign of the predisposition of the academic board to give a 
pass to an arguably weak candidate. The most frequent grade ob-
tained in the oral exam was 5.00, probably because of an aversion to 
rejecting ambiguous candidates based on a decimal difference, a 
well-known effect in the literature (see Fig. 1) (17, 18). For our pur-
poses, the moment in which each candidate took the oral exam was 
randomly determined by a candidates’ surname lottery: Candidates 
who had a surname that started with the letter Y were called to be 
the first to do the exam. The list was then filled in alphabetical 
order. This random device successfully avoids selection biases as 
shown by the balance in observable characteristics (gender, age, 
years of experience, and grades in subsequent exams of the selection 
process) over our independent variable of interest (see Table 1).
On average, candidates obtained a grade of 5.50 (SD = 2.12), and 
62% of them obtained a pass to progress to the next exams. To 
explore how an act of generosity affected the likelihood of passing 
the oral exam for subsequent candidates, we estimated linear prob-
ability model regressions with candidates’ probability of passing 
(0 = fail, 1 = pass) as the dependent variable and the number of 
candidates given a 5.00 earlier on the same day by the same academ-
ic board as the treatment variable. The analysis is restricted to the 
fifth and later oral exams for a given day to ensure that every candi-
date had at least a probability above 0.10 of being part of the exper-
imental condition, that is, that jury members previously endorsed at 
least one act of generosity. This restriction is applied because we 
considered that analyzing data in which candidates had a lower prob-
ability than 0.10 to be in the experimental condition would provide 
very noisy estimates of the generosity-erosion effect due to the re-
duced observations available of the experimental condition. Neverthe-
less, the result still holds whether the whole sample is analyzed, with the 
effect size of the generosity-effect increasing monotonically as the 
probability to be in the experimental condition increases (see fig. S1).
Figure 2A shows descriptive evidence that the average grade and 
the candidates’ probability of passing the exam decreased when 
candidates defended the oral exam after at least one previous candi-
date was graded with 5.00. Figure 2B shows the results of formally 
estimating the effect of generosity-erosion. We present three differ-
ent specifications. In the unadjusted model, we include the number 
of previous candidates who obtained an exact 5.00, tribunal, day of 
the exam, and the order of examination as explanatory variables. In 
the adjusted one, we also include candidates’ observable character-
istics. Last, in the combined model, we also include the measure for 
contrast effect (i.e., a categorical variable that takes the value 1 if the 
prior candidate has passed the exam and 0 otherwise) and of narrow 
bracketing (i.e., the proportion of previous candidates who have 
passed the oral test). We can see that the results are very robust 
across specifications. In the most demanding one, the combined 
model, we find that the probability of passing decreases by 4.80 per-
centage points (SE = 0.023), meaning a relative probability reduc-
tion of 7.7% to pass the exam, for each previous candidate that 
during the day was graded with an exact 5.00. This effect is larger 
than the contrast and narrow-bracketing effects and the only one 
that remains significant in the combined model (see Table 2). Fur-
thermore, results remain the same if the analysis is performed on 
grades instead of probability of passing (see table S1), showing the 
strength of the generosity-erosion effect, since it negatively affects 
all grades, not only the probability of passing (see Fig. 1A).
The analysis pipeline described was not preregistered. Research-
ers face several forking paths in their analytical decisions that can 
lead to bias (19). One method to circumvent this is to report other 
forking paths and still show the same result. Simply put, if the main 
effect survives a variety of specifications, then one can be more con-
fident of its robustness. We conducted several analyses that opera-
tionalized the contrast and narrow-bracketing effects differently. In 
all cases, results remained unchanged, with the generosity-erosion 
effect as the only variable that significantly biased candidates’ grades 
(see the Supplementary Materials).
Last, to control for possible effects of randomness in our data 
that could underly our effect, such as regression to the mean, we ran 
all analyses again by reshuffling the order of candidates. No effects 
were observed in this placebo test (see Fig. 2B), reinforcing the ro-
bustness of our results.
One crucial feature of the hiring process analyzed was that pass-
ing the exam was more likely than failing the exam (62% of candi-
dates passed it). Because of this, evaluators might be especially akin 
to feelings of guilt when failing a candidate, which might lead to an 
avoidance to do so. Only after pardoning a failure, or several of 
them, evaluators will feel comfortable enough to fail ambiguous 
weak candidates. If this mechanism underlies the generosity-erosion 
effect, hiring processes that are unlikely to cause feelings of guilt will 
not be affected by the generosity-erosion effect. To elucidate the 
pervasiveness of the generosity-erosion effect and directly test this 
hypothesis, we explored a very selective hiring process in which fail-
ing was the norm rather than the exception.
The boundary conditions of the generosity-erosion effect: 
Strictness precludes lenience
Following the previous operationalization, we once again define an 
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receive to continue in the hiring process. In this hiring process, in 
which candidates to judge were evaluated, 25.00 (of 50.00) was the 
cutting point (see Materials and Methods for more information). In 
contrast with the previous hiring process, candidates were more 
likely to fail than to pass the exam, as 65% of them failed. Candi-
dates who failed were left ungraded, which precludes us from ana-
lyzing grades instead of the likelihood to pass. The same analysis 
pipeline conducted was applied to these data, and we preregistered 
before analysis. The code for all analyses, synthetic data (20) for 
experiment 1, as well as the entire data and preregistration for ex-
periment 2, can be found at https://osf.io/47ngz/.
In the current setting, no information is available regarding the 
day in which each candidate was examined. Instead, we have access 
to the session each candidate belonged to and the number of the 
sequence within the session, which typically lasted for 3 days. As a 
consequence, the analysis and main independent variables were 
split by session instead of within a day. Generosity erosion was cal-
culated by counting all the previous candidates who obtained the 
lowest possible grade to continue in the hiring process (i.e., 25.00 of 50). 
In parallel, the narrow-bracketing effect was calculated by averag-
ing all previous candidates who passed the exam. Since the contrast 
effect only considered whether the previous candidate passed or not, 
the specification of this variable was the same as in the previous 
hiring process.
Results reveal that the generosity-erosion effect did not signifi-
cantly change the likelihood of passing the exam, not even under 
the simplest specification (see Table 3). In contrast with the previ-
ous result, we find that for each SD in narrow bracketing, the prob-
ability of passing decreases by 4.88 percentage points (SE = 0.024), 
meaning a relative probability reduction of 14.04% to pass the exam 
(see Table 3). As in the previous hiring process, the contrast effect 
did not play a significant role in this scenario (see Table 3). Overall, 
when the vast majority of candidates are failing, the probability to 
fail does not decrease due to previous acts of generosity. However, 
candidates do fail more when the average of previously approved 
candidates deviates from what is expected, as denoted by the narrow- 
bracketing effect.
DISCUSSION
Collectively evaluating candidates is, ultimately, a social decision 
that resembles the structure of a dictator game: One party (the examining 
board) holds all the power to decide about the future outcome of 
another party (the candidates). On the basis of this insight, we 
linked the outcomes of an evaluation process, grades of an oral 
exam, with a well-known phenomenon extracted from the social 
decision-making literature: In dictator games, generosity is eroded 
by repetition (15). Results reveal that markers of past generosity 
within a day by the examining board (i.e., grading a candidate with 
the lowest grade possible to continue in the recruitment process) 
had a negative effect on the probability that successive candidates 
will pass the oral exam. Specifically, candidates were 7.7% less likely 
to pass for each candidate who previously obtained the lowest possi-
ble grade to continue in the process (5.00 of 10). The generosity- 
erosion effect was the unique predictor that prevailed after controlling 
for cognitive mechanisms that have been previously described as 
the causes of sequential effects when jurors evaluate the perform-
ance of candidates [contrast effects (11) and narrow bracketing 
(13)]. Furthermore, as indexed by the forking path and simulation 
analysis, the generosity-erosion effect is robust, since it survives several 
specifications and is not the by-product of randomness in the data 
(e.g., regression to the mean) but a structure that the examining 
board imposed on the data. Caution needs to be added, however, 
since the generosity-erosion effect in hiring decisions has not been 
previously demonstrated. Future research is needed to estimate its 
generalizability and pervasiveness in recruitment processes.
Simply put, when evaluators assessed one candidate as just good 
enough to be maintained in the hiring process, the cost was charged 
to the outcome of future candidates. Moving beyond the descrip-
tion of the effect, we explored its boundary conditions in a very se-
lective hiring process. Replicating previous work, narrow bracketing 
significantly biased candidates’ evaluation under these circumstances: 
A candidate was less likely to pass as the percentage of the previous 
candidates who passed increased. We replicated this effect in a very 
selective hiring process, similar to the context in which it was first 
described (MBA applications) (13). Our results indicate that the 
Table 1. Candidate’s characteristics by the number of previous candidates with a score of 5.00. Categorical variables are expressed in % and continuous 
variables are expressed in mean (SD). 
Previous 5.00 grades None One Two or more P value
N = 2375 N = 424 N = 58
Type of position: 0.14
School 2005 (84.4%) 353 (83.3%) 47 (81.0%)
High School 192 (8.08%) 22 (5.19%) 6 (10.3%)
Vocational School 178 (7.49%) 49 (11.6%) 5 (8.62%)
Gender: 0.08
Female 1945 (81.9%) 352 (83.0%) 41 (70.7%)
Male 430 (18.1%) 72 (17.0%) 17 (29.3%)
Hour 14.0 (2.12) 14.0 (2.19) 14.1 (2.16) 0.91
Score test 2a 5.44 (1.83) 5.54 (1.85) 5.60 (2.25) 0.67
Score test 2b 5.88 (1.90) 5.84 (1.87) 5.71 (1.83) 0.86
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narrow-bracketing effect can also appear in recruitment processes 
with several evaluators instead of only one, as previously described.
Aggregated judgments are often successful at reducing individu-
al bias and boosting accuracy (21). In the current contexts, however, 
the collective structure of the decision did not protect candidates 
from an unfairly biased assessment, regardless of the strategy used 
to reach a final grade. In experiment 1, we find evidence for the 
generosity erosion-effect despite the evaluators using a scoring- 
average strategy, commonly linked to improvements in judgment 
(22). In the same vein, we find evidence for the narrow-bracketing 
effect even with 10 evaluators and a grading strategy that included 
two steps. First, evaluators decided by majority vote if the candidate 
deserved to be evaluated. Second, and only if the result was affirma-
tive, a grade was given by averaging it across the 10 evaluators. Only 
when the grade was equal or more than 25 (of 50), a candidate was 
considered to pass the exam. The relative complexity of this grading 
system did not prevent the existence of biases in grading since it 
suffered from narrow bracketing. Future research could explore the 
degree to which sequential effects in collective judgments depend 
on the method used to aggregate judgments (23).
An open question for future investigation concerns the mecha-
nisms causing the generosity-erosion effect. By testing the boundary 
conditions, we have attempted an answer while at the same time estab-
lishing the pervasiveness of the effect across hiring processes. With 
the current results, we propose two nonmutually exclusive psycho-
logical factors: guilt aversion and a biased evidence accumulation.
People are guilt averse: We often treat others fairly simply to 
avoid feelings of guilt, which are likely to arise if the expectations of 
Fig. 2. Results when hiring public teachers (experiment 1). Density distribution (A) and model estimates (B) of the generosity erosion effect for hiring teachers.
Table 2. Estimates for generosity-erosion effect for hiring teachers. Estimates present the absolute probability effect. SEs were estimated with the Huber 
Sandwich estimator and clustered at the tribunal and day level. 
Effect Model Estimate 95% Confidence Interval P value
Generosity erosion Unadjusted −0.055 −0.098 −0.012 0.01
Contrast effect Unadjusted −0.038 −0.076 0.000 0.04
Narrow bracketing Unadjusted −0.038 −0.079 0.003 0.07
Generosity erosion Adjusted −0.054 −0.098 −0.011 0.01
Contrast effect Adjusted −0.037 −0.075 0.001 0.06
Narrow bracketing Adjusted −0.040 −0.081 0.002 0.06
Generosity erosion Combined −0.048 −0.092 −0.004 0.03
Contrast effect Combined −0.026 −0.069 0.017 0.23
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others are not met (24). In the current evaluative context, fairness 
can be defined as grading each candidate according to their merits. 
Guilt, thus, can emerge as the result of overgrading or undergrading 
a candidate. There is an intuitive asymmetry, however, between the 
two: Overgrading does not have a single, identifiable victim, while 
undergrading does have an identifiable victim. Because of it, under-
grading is likely to elicit stronger feelings of guilt than overgrading 
(the identifiable victim phenomenon) (25). Arguably, the highest 
transgression is to deny a candidate the opportunity to continue in 
the process when they deserve it. Evaluators, therefore, are likely to 
be overly cautious in failing candidates to avoid type II errors, 
which is similar to common wisdom in society (e.g., the principle 
that legal systems should protect innocent people at the cost of 
sometimes freeing guilty people). Guilt aversion will consequently 
cause generosity in grading by allowing ambiguous candidates to be 
kept in the hiring process. However, grading several candidates 
with the lowest grade required to stay in the process (5.00) provides 
evidence, at least in the eyes of the evaluators, that they have already 
proven their fairness. This might reduce their feelings of guilt for 
failing future candidates, thus becoming harsher in their grading. 
An independent line of research supports this notion: People are 
more likely to commit a moral transgression just after proving their 
moral virtuosity (i.e., moral licensing (26). Simply put therefore, re-
petitive acts of generosity might increase harshness in grading by 
reducing feelings of guilt associated with them. In favor of this ac-
count, we failed to find evidence for the generosity-erosion effect in 
a hiring process in which evaluators were unlikely to feel guilty 
when failing a candidate since failing was the norm rather than the 
exception. High strictness in a hiring process might preclude le-
nience, an interesting idea that can open future avenues of research.
Alternatively, a successful model of decision making posits that 
there are three parameters when deciding between two options (i.e., 
fail/pass): A bias that makes people lean more toward one option or 
another, a drift rate that serves as evidence accumulation toward 
one of the two options, and a threshold that, once crossed, signifies 
that a final decision has been reached (27). If we apply this model to 
the scenario in which the generosity-erosion effect was observed, 
one explanation is that the academic board had distinct parameters 
for failing and for passing candidates. More candidates passed the 
exam than failed, suggesting that the baseline mindset for the aca-
demic board might have been to pass a candidate if not convinced 
of the opposite. In contrast, this mindset is likely to be the opposite 
when failing is the norm rather than the exception, such as in the 
hiring process in which no generosity effect was observed. Grading 
a candidate with the lowest possible grade to continue in the process 
might cause a change in parameters for subsequent candidates, such 
as making decisions more biased toward failing, or reduce the 
threshold needed to fail a candidate. Sequential changes in parame-
ters during decision making have been observed in the past, al-
though in more basic low-level decisions such as perceptual 
decisions (28). The two mechanisms proposed are not mutually 
exclusive. One of the reasons why decisions to fail could have dis-
tinct parameters from decisions to pass might be guilt aversion.
A clear understanding of the mechanisms behind the generosity- 
erosion effect is crucial for policy makers since they will imply dif-
ferent interventions to reduce these effects in hiring processes. For 
example, if guilt aversion is the main mechanism underlying the 
generosity-erosion effect, a possible intervention could be to ran-
domly select a subsample of the evaluators’ grades to calculate the 
final grade. Using this protocol, none of the evaluators will know 
which grades lead to failure. This will probably reduce the guilt as-
sociated with failing a candidate since it has been shown that in-
creasing uncertainty between people’s actions and their outcomes 
causes people to behave more immorally (29), arguably because the 
added uncertainty alleviates feelings of guilt by allowing people to 
deny the role played in the negative outcome.
Similarities can be drawn between the hiring processes investi-
gated here and past research. As previously mentioned, MBA 
admissions are negatively affected by the average grade of previous 
candidates on the same day (13). As shown here, in contexts in 
which receiving a positive evaluation is the exception rather than 
the norm, it is unlikely to find evidence for the generosity-erosion 
effect. On the other hand, sequential judgments of parole are a per-
fect candidate for the generosity-erosion effect (14). Although 
previous work has established sequential effects, these have been 
attributed to contrast with the previous candidate. Because the na-
ture of the evaluation does not allow us to identify when evaluators 
were generous, it is impossible to analyze whether the generosity- 
erosion effect is taking place.
Companies, governments, and universities are constantly mak-
ing high-stake decisions based on judgments regarding the perform-
ance and quality of candidates. Research on how people are 
Table 3. Estimates for generosity-erosion effect for hiring judges. Estimates present the absolute probability effect. SEs were estimated with the Huber 
Sandwich estimator and clustered at the tribunal and day level 
Effect Model Estimate 95% Confidence Interval P value
Generosity erosion Unadjusted −0.031 −0.074 0.011 0.15
Contrast effect Unadjusted 0.006 −0.032 0.044 0.74
Narrow bracketing Unadjusted −0.045 −0.087 −0.003 0.04
Generosity erosion Adjusted −0.028 −0.073 0.018 0.23
Contrast effect Adjusted 0.002 −0.039 0.042 0.94
Narrow bracketing Adjusted −0.038 −0.082 0.007 0.09
Generosity erosion Combined −0.026 −0.070 0.018 0.25
Contrast effect Combined 0.015 −0.026 0.056 0.47
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affected by unnecessary features when making these crucial decisions 
has mainly accounted for them based on cognitive mechanisms. 
Often, it has ignored one fundamental aspect of these decisions: 
They are about people. Bearing in mind the social element of these 
decisions, we found a novel effect that explains evaluations more 
powerfully than classical cognitive mechanisms previously estab-
lished. Evidence taken from basic game theory paradigms is thus 
able to successfully provide insights on how decisions, one after 
another, are made.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Experiment 1: We examined the generosity-erosion effect by ana-
lyzing data from a selection process to hire teachers in Catalonia, 
Spain. The Catalan Department of Education provided the data, 
which are available under request to the Departament d’Educació–
Generalitat de Catalunya. The first part of the selection process 
comprised an oral exam in which each candidate defended their 
syllabus to an academic board of five members. After their presen-
tation, each juror graded the candidate individually from 0 to 10. 
The final grade was then determined by averaging the five different 
grades from the academic board. If the highest and lowest grades 
given by the committee differed from each other by more than three 
points, those extreme grades were discarded and the average was 
calculated with the remaining three grades. This process lasted 
around 45 min. We use the gradings from this oral exam to investi-
gate the presence of the generosity-erosion effect and compare it 
with contrast and narrow-bracketing effects (see table S1 for results 
regarding contrast and narrow-bracketing effects).
From each of the 20,254 candidates who enrolled to participate 
in this recruitment process, we obtained information on gender, 
years of work experience, grades in each part of the hiring process 
(the oral exam and two subsequent written exams), and their area of 
specialty (among 47). Furthermore, we can identify each of the 
182 examining boards evaluating the candidates. After discarding 
candidates who did not present themselves to the oral exam, we an-
alyze the data from the resulting 11,281 candidates.
Experiment 2: We replicated the analysis using data from candi-
dates who are in the hiring process to become judges in Spain. The 
data are available on the website of the Spanish General Council of 
the Judiciary. This hiring process consisted of three exams. The first 
one was multiple choice with 100 questions. Only a portion of can-
didates is defined as the best and make it through to the next stage 
(around 1500 candidates/year). The second exam, which is the one 
we analyzed, consists of an oral presentation (60 min). Specifically, 
candidates must orally explain five topics each, randomly assigned 
the day of the exam for each candidate, and assessed by an examin-
ing board of nine members. After the presentation, the board casts 
a vote to accept or reject the candidate. If the candidate gets the 
majority of affirmative votes, then they evaluate whether they obtained 
a grade higher or equal to 25.00 points (of 50 points). Only under 
this circumstance, the candidate remains in the selection process.
We analyzed the calls in 2018 and 2019 of the Spanish Judiciary. 
A total of 8546 (4193 in 2018 and 4353 in 2019) candidates took part 
in the selection process and only 3171 passed the first exam (1651 in 
2018 and 1520 in 2019). Candidates were then allocated along 
35 sessions and 6 boards per call for the oral exams. Each session 
lasted 3 days, with 16 candidates per session on average. For each 
candidate, we obtained information regarding the grading in the 
multiple choice exam and the oral exam, their examining board, the 
examining session, and the order in which they presented within 
the session.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
Supplementary material for this article is available at http://advances.sciencemag.org/cgi/
content/full/7/17/eabe2045/DC1
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